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The Economics of Asset Securitization
sset securitization — transforming illiquid 
assets into tradable securities — is a large and 
growing market, even rivaling the corporate 
debt market in size. While the underlying 
assets can be very different — ranging from song royalties 
to home mortgages — most asset-backed securities 
nevertheless share some distinctive features. In “The 
Economics of Asset Securitization,” Ronel Elul explains 
why asset-backed securities exist and discusses some 
reasons for their common structure. 
In 1997 rock star David Bowie 
raised $55 million by selling bonds 
backed by revenues from his first 25 
albums.1  This was the first applica-
tion of securitization to intellectual 
property. Formally speaking, asset 
securitization refers to the process 
whereby nontraded assets — such as 
song royalties — are transformed into 
tradable securities, called asset-backed 
securities, or ABS, through the repack-
aging of their cash flows. Some more 
mainstream examples of asset-backed 
securities include mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and secured credit 
card receivables. 
Securitization is a large and grow-
ing market. Currently, it represents 
about 25 percent of new nongovern-
ment borrowing.2  To take just one 
of the sectors mentioned above, at 
the end of 2003 there was more than 
$7 trillion in securitized mortgages, 
representing nearly three-quarters of 
all outstanding home loans. 
While the underlying assets can 
be very different (in terms of matu-
rity, collateral, and risk, for example), 
ABS nevertheless tend to share some 
common features. These common 
elements, which we discuss in fur-
ther detail below, include selling the 
underlying assets so that they are 
moved off the firm’s balance sheet, 
grouping individually illiquid assets 
into portfolios, taking steps to reduce 
the risk of default on the underlying 
assets (known as credit enhance-
ment), and subdividing the assets into 
several classes of securities (tranching). 
Financial economists have attempted 
to explain the underlying reasons for 
securitization, as well as these common 
features.  
MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES: AN EXAMPLE OF 
ASSET SECURITIZATION
Consider, for example, a bank 
(the originator) that offers a $200,000 
mortgage to a home buyer (see Figure) 
with an interest rate of 6 percent. 
Rather than hold this loan in its 
portfolio and receive small monthly 
payments for a period of 30 years, the 
bank may prefer to move the loan off 
its balance sheet by selling it to an 
outside investor. In this way the bank 
receives funds today from selling the 
loan, so that it has the opportunity to 
profit further by originating even more 
loans; the reason is that the bank typi-
cally collects a fee (the origination fee) 
for each loan it originates.3  There are 
also other motivations for securitiza-
tion that we will discuss below. But for 
now, let’s look at how the bank in our 
example might use securitization.
1 Despite initial predictions, this has not led to 
a wave of such issues, in part because the Bowie 
bonds themselves have not performed quite as 
well as expected (because online music piracy 
has curtailed revenues from music sales).
2 Further detail can be found in the Flow of 
Funds Accounts tabulated by the Federal Re-
serve Board.
3 A typical fee is 1 percent of the loan amount.  Business Review  Q3  2005   17 www.philadelphiafed.org
The problem is that an individual 
loan is very illiquid, i.e., hard to sell, 
in part because potential buyers know 
much less about the homeowner than 
does the bank. For example, the bank 
probably knows more about its own 
underwriting standards than any 
potential buyer, or the bank may have 
had a prior lending relationship with 
the borrower.  Instead of selling the 
entire loan to an individual buyer, the 
bank can agree to sell all or most of its 
loans to an issuer — typically a gov-
ernment sponsored enterprise (GSE) 
such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
— that pools these loans with ones 
made by other lenders (see Figure). For 
example, rather than a single $200,000 
mortgage, the pool may consist of 
$600,000 in mortgages — that is, 
three such loans.4  This means that in-
stead of buying 100 percent of a single 
mortgage, a potential investor who has 
$200,000 to spend may end up with a 
claim on one-third of each mortgage. 
The GSE will place these mort-
gages in a trust (also known as a 
special-purpose vehicle) (see Figure) and 
then insure the pool against default; 
this is a form of credit enhancement, 
a technique for improving the credit 
quality of one or more of the vehicle’s 
assets. Credit enhancement can take 
several forms: overcollateralization (so 
that the dollar value of the assets in 
the pool exceeds the value of the secu-
rities issued), the use of a GSE or other 
outside insurer to guarantee payment, 
and tranching, which we discuss later. 
In many securitizations more than one 
of these may be used.
The trust then issues securities, 
known as mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS), against this pool. Like other 
bonds, these securities promise the 
4 In practice, a typical pool may consist of sev-
eral hundred loans and have a face value of $50 
million.
buyer regular interest payments and 
the return of principal at maturity, and 
they are financed from the cash flows 
of the underlying mortgages. Notice 
that when the assets are moved off 
balance sheet, they are legally sepa-
rated from the bank that originated 
the mortgages, so that creditors of 
the bank (such as depositors and its 
bondholders) do not have any claims 
on these assets, and investors who re-
ceive mortgage payments do not have 
any claims on the originating bank. A 
certain amount is deducted from the 
monthly payments on the mortgages 
before they are passed through to the 
investor; this money covers the servic-
ing of the mortgages (i.e., collecting 
the monthly payments, which is often 
done by the issuing bank) and also 
serves as compensation to the GSE 
for its guarantee. For instance, in our 
example, although homeowners pay an 
interest rate of 6 percent, investors may 
receive only 5.5 percent.
Investors will usually find it more 
attractive to purchase an MBS than 
to purchase an individual mortgage 
loan. First, investors are exposed to 
much less risk because the pooling 
process diversifies away the impact of 
an individual mortgage’s performance. 
For example, investors do not need 
to worry as much about an individ-
ual homeowner’s behavior (although 
economy-wide disturbances that affect 
many homeowners at once will still be 
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The issuer of the MBS may also further 
manipulate the cash ﬂows from the pool of 
mortgages by splitting them into classes 
known as tranches. 
also much more liquid than individual 
mortgages because the pooling process 
makes each MBS much more similar 
to its peers; that is, pooling makes 
the characteristics of an individual 
loan much less important to potential 
investors. This reduces the amount of 
information potential investors need to 
collect before purchasing the security 
and thereby makes it easier to trade.
Finally, the issuer of the MBS may 
also further manipulate the cash flows 
from the pool of mortgages by splitting 
them into classes known as tranches 
(see Figure).5  The difference between 
one tranche and another varies de-
pending on the type of asset securi-
tized. In the case of mortgage-backed 
securities, tranches are often struc-
tured in terms of principal payments 
on the mortgages in the pool. That is, 
the structure is used to allocate prepay-
ment risk, the risk that a security will 
pay off before its maturity date, thereby 
forcing the investor to reinvest his 
funds at a (possibly) lower rate. The 
simplest structure is known as “sequen-
tial pay” (more complex ones are also 
used). As the name suggests, in this 
case the tranches are retired in sequen-
tial order. That is, investors in the first 
— senior — tranche receive principal 
payments from the underlying assets 
first, those in the second tranche next, 
and so on. Investors in the last — most 
junior — tranche receive principal pay-
ments from the mortgages in the pool 
only when the tranches ahead of them 
in priority have been fully paid.
For instance, suppose that in our 
example, the $600,000 pool consisting 
of three mortgages was divided into 
two tranches: a senior one with a prin-
cipal balance of $200,000 and a more 
junior one with a balance of $400,000. 
Then if all mortgages paid according to 
schedule, it would take 16.5 years for 
the senior tranche to be paid down.6 
During this time, the senior tranche 
would receive all of the principal pay-
ments on the mortgages in the pool, as 
well as interest payments of 5.5 percent 
on its outstanding balance. The junior 
tranche would receive only its interest 
payments. After the senior tranche 
has been fully paid down, the junior 
tranche would then begin to receive 
principal payments and would be fully 
retired after 30 years.7 
Now suppose that shortly after 
the mortgages are issued, one of the 
homeowners sells his house and pays 
off his mortgage. In this case, the 
senior tranche is paid off immediately. 
The junior tranche would then begin 
to receive principal payments as well; 
nevertheless, so long as the other mort-
gages do not pre-pay, it would still take 
30 years to fully pay down this tranche. 
Notice that the junior tranche is thus 
much less sensitive to prepayment risk 
than the senior tranche. 
However, in other ABS, the 
absence of a GSE guarantee means 
that the determining factor in struc-
turing the tranches is typically credit 
risk; that is, a senior tranche would 
have priority over a junior one in the 
event of a default, so that it has first 
claim on the securitization’s underly-
ing assets.  As a result, tranching can 
serve as a form of credit enhancement; 
in particular, it enhances the credit 
quality of the more senior tranches at 
the expense of the junior ones (the 
senior tranche is typically AAA-rated 
in these cases).8 
In this example we can see the key 
features of asset securitization: a sale of 
the underlying assets so that they are 
moved off the issuer’s balance sheet, 
the pooling of illiquid assets, credit 
enhancement, and tranching.
WHAT ASYMMETRIC INFOR-
MATION CAN TELL US ABOUT 
ASSET SECURITIZATION
When Investors Are Unin-
formed, Capital Structure Matters. 
A firm’s decision about whether — and 
how — to securitize assets can be 
viewed as a variant of the broader 
question of how a firm should finance 
5 In the case of mortgages, a tranched security is 
known as a REMIC (real estate mortgage invest-
ment conduit) or CMO (collateralized mortgage 
obligation).
6 This figure can easily be obtained from any 
online mortgage amortization calculator; several 
such calculators are available.
7 Notice that another implication of the sequen-
tial pay structure is that the senior tranche has a 
shorter maturity than the underlying mortgages; 
thus, tranching also facilitates participation in 
this market by investors with shorter investment 
horizons.
8 Bonds are rated according to their default 
risk by ratings agencies, the most prominent 
of which are Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s. Although each agency uses slightly 
different classifications, ratings are assigned in 
alphabetical order, with AAA being the least 
risky (Aaa for Moody’s) and D representing 
a bond that is in default. Bonds rated BBB or 
above by Standard & Poor’s (Baa for Moody’s) 
are termed “investment grade.”  Business Review  Q3  2005   19 www.philadelphiafed.org
The problem ﬁrms face when issuing equity is 
that outsiders are understandably suspicious 
that insiders know something they do not and 
that the stock is overvalued.
itself. This is known as the capital 
structure decision. 
In 1958, future Nobel Prize win-
ners Franco Modigliani and Merton 
Miller showed that the form of financ-
ing a firm uses does not affect the total 
value of its assets under a number of 
particular assumptions. This is known 
as the Modigliani-Miller proposition. 
Some key assumptions — which we 
will revisit below — are that corporate 
bankruptcy is costless, that there are 
no applicable government regula-
tions, and that all types of securities 
have similar tax treatment. Another 
important assumption is that outside 
investors are as well informed as the 
firm’s insiders (such as management) 
about the firm’s prospects. When this 
is true, insiders and outsiders are said 
to be symmetrically informed. 
On the other hand, when insid-
ers know more than outside inves-
tors (which is often a more realistic 
assumption), the mix of debt securities9   
and equity (that is, stock) — and who 
holds each — can affect the firm’s 
ability to secure funds from outside in-
vestors and, ultimately, the value of the 
firm itself. Two classic papers examine 
these issues, and the ideas in these ar-
ticles can also be used to explain some 
of the key features of ABS.
In their article, economists Hayne 
Leland and David Pyle explain why 
insiders tend to retain an equity stake 
in their firm, rather than selling all of 
the firm’s shares to the public. Insid-
ers who believe that a firm’s future 
profits are likely to be high would 
like to convince skeptical investors. 
On the other hand, skeptical inves-
tors believe that talk is cheap. They 
reason that insiders are simply trying 
to sell stock in the firm at the high-
est possible price, whatever the firm’s 
true prospects. However, insiders can 
credibly signal their information to the 
market by holding a larger share of the 
firm’s stock. In effect, an insider who 
holds a significant ownership stake is 
putting his money where his mouth is. 
This allows the firm to sell its stock 
at a higher price but will leave insid-
ers exposed to more risk because their 
ownership share in the firm keeps 
them from holding a well-diversified 
portfolio; this increased risk is the cost 
insiders must bear to gain credibility.  
An article by economists Stewart 
Myers and Nicholas Majluf explains 
why firms often prefer to sell debt 
securities rather than issue equity to 
outside investors. The problem firms 
face when issuing equity is that outsid-
ers are understandably suspicious that 
insiders know something they do not 
and that the stock is overvalued. As 
a result, the firm can increase the 
price investors are willing to pay for 
its securities by offering securities that 
are informationally insensitive, that is, 
securities whose payoffs do not depend 
on factors known only to insiders. 
For example, since debt payments 
are contractually fixed whether the 
firm’s profit is high or low, debt is less 
informationally sensitive than equity; 
therefore, the firm can secure outside 
funds at a lower cost by issuing bonds 
rather than stock.10 
I’ll now show how these ideas can 
help to explain some of the distinctive 
features of securitization.
Tranching Allows Issuers to Sell 
Safe Cash Flows and Retain Risky 
Ones.  Suppose an issuer (for example, 
a bank) has a portfolio of assets such 
as credit card receivables, that is, 
expected payments on credit card bal-
ances. This portfolio is not as liquid as 
the issuer would like, and so the issuer 
might prefer to sell part of it for cash 
through a securitization. However, the 
issuer’s information about the qual-
ity of its assets is superior to that of 
potential investors, perhaps because 
the bank has proprietary information 
about its customers that it has col-
lected over a long period. Having such 
information makes any sale costly and 
difficult.  The bank’s goal is to struc-
ture the security so as to maximize its 
revenue from selling the assets. 
Economists Peter DeMarzo and 
Darrell Duffie show that to maximize 
revenue, the issuer should sell a senior 
tranche backed by the assets while 
retaining the junior tranche. By anal-
ogy with the firm’s capital structure 
9 Corporate and government bonds are common 
examples of debt securities. A debt security 
represents the issuer’s promise to repay the 
loan’s face amount, with interest, in a set 
period of time. By contrast, the firm is under 
no contractual obligation to pay shareholders 
dividends of any set amount.
10 This is known as the Myers-Majluf pecking 
order theory because the firm has a “pecking 
order” of financing choices. It relies as much as 
possible on retained earnings (which bypasses 
outside investors completely). If retained 
earnings do not suffice to finance its projects, it 
issues debt. Only if the firm does not have the 
earnings to make debt payments does it issue 
equity to outside investors (a start-up firm might 
fall into this category).20   Q3  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
In many cases, 
investors may actually 
know at least as much 
about the assets as 
the issuer, and even 
more signiﬁcantly, 
some potential 
investors may know 
more than others. 
decision, the most junior tranche is 
also often termed the equity stake. 
Moreover, they show that the higher 
the quality of the assets, the larger this 
retained equity stake. This follows the 
work of Leland and Pyle in that the 
issuer signals that its assets are of high 
quality by holding an equity stake; 
it is also reminiscent of Myers and 
Majluf’s model in that an information-
ally insensitive security is issued to 
uninformed outside investors.
To take a recent example, which 
is fairly typical, in a 2002 credit card 
securitization by Fleet Bank (now 
part of Bank of America), the issuer 
retained an equity interest equal to 
approximately 10 percent of the total 
principal. 
Peter DeMarzo further extends 
this model to explain why we often 
see pooling of assets (recall that this is 
a distinctive feature of many securi-
tizations) before tranching occurs. 
DeMarzo shows that pooling assets 
involves a tradeoff. On the one hand, 
by selling different assets as a single 
unit, the issuer cannot signal infor-
mation about the asset by retaining 
a specific amount of equity for each 
individual asset. On the other hand, 
to the extent that pooling diversifies 
idiosyncratic risk, it allows the issuer 
to sell a larger quantity of information-
ally insensitive securities.11  When the 
benefits from diversification outweigh 
the limitations of selling the assets 
together (for example, when the issuer 
has many similar mortgages available), 
then pooling is beneficial.
Tranching Increases Informa-
tion Production by Investors. While 
DeMarzo and Duffie’s model provides 
useful insights, its underlying assump-
tions do not reflect significant parts 
of the ABS market.  In many cases, 
investors may actually know at least 
as much about the assets as the issuer, 
and even more significantly, some 
potential investors may know more 
than others (this is the case for mort-
gage-backed securities, for example). 
Of course, investors do not receive this 
information for free. Hedge funds that 
specialize in buying mortgage-backed 
securities must pay substantial salaries 
to Ph.D.s who understand these securi-
ties. 
Economists Arnoud Boot and 
Anjan Thakor develop a model in 
which sellers of ABS exploit the fact 
that potential investors may choose to 
invest in learning about the underly-
ing assets. Boot and Thakor show that 
both the pooling and tranching of 
assets can encourage investors to learn 
about these assets, so that they are 
willing to pay more for them. 
Their idea is that by separating 
the cash flows from the asset into 
senior and junior tranches, the issuer 
creates a highly informationally sensi-
tive security — the junior tranche. 
Since a junior tranche is riskier, 
investors need to learn more about the 
assets underlying this junior security in 
order to determine whether it is worth 
buying. By contrast, a high-rated senior 
tranche carries less risk, so that even 
uninformed investors can safely invest 
in it. 
This structure maximizes incen-
tives for sophisticated investors to be-
come informed about the value of the 
underlying assets, since such investors 
can specialize in buying only this most 
informationally sensitive portion of the 
cash flows. Conversely, uninformed 
investors purchase the informationally 
insensitive senior tranche. Also note 
that unlike in DeMarzo and Duffie’s 
model, the issuing firm itself does not 
need to retain anything, since it knows 
nothing more than investors do. 
Boot and Thakor also offer a simi-
lar explanation for why securitizations 
often involve the pooling of assets. The 
reason is that the risks of the assets 
pooled in the ABS have two compo-
nents: a common one (such as inter-
est-rate risk or national price trends in 
the case of mortgages) and an idiosyn-
cratic one (e.g., a particular borrower’s 
individual default risk). Pooling assets 
makes acquiring information more ef-
fective because the idiosyncratic risk is 
diversified and investors can concen-
trate their efforts on learning about 
the common characteristics of these 
assets without worrying that their 
efforts will be undone by an individual 
homeowner’s unpredictable finances. 
Economist Guillaume Plantin 
provides evidence that in collateralized 
debt obligations,12  it indeed appears 
as if sophisticated investors, such as 
hedge funds, purchase the more junior 
“equity” tranches, whereas relatively 
unsophisticated investors specialize in 
11 Idiosyncratic risk is risk related to the unique 
circumstances of a specific loan or borrower, as 
opposed to overall market risk, which affects 
many assets at once.
12 Collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, are 
securities in which the underlying assets are 
themselves loans or bonds, most typically risky 
corporate debt (“junk bonds”).  Business Review  Q3  2005   21 www.philadelphiafed.org
In an auction where each bidder has his own 
information about the true value of the items 
being sold, there is the risk that the buyer who 
wins the auction is the one who has overpaid. 
the high-rated senior tranches, com-
monly known as “A” tranches.13 
Structures with Many Tranches. 
In the models discussed above, the 
resulting structure of the securitiza-
tion is very simple: usually only two 
tranches, one senior and one junior. In 
practice, most structures are somewhat 
more complicated and feature multiple 
tranches. For example, in the Fleet 
credit card securitization discussed ear-
lier, there were actually three tranches: 
a senior AAA-rated “A” tranche, a 
more junior “B” tranche (which was A 
rated), and the unrated equity tranche. 
Plantin’s paper explains why these 
multiple tranches might arise; he also 
demonstrates that — as in the papers 
by Boot and Thakor and DeMarzo 
and Duffie — the optimal structure is 
a senior-junior securitization in which 
the higher-rated senior tranches have 
absolute priority over the low-rated 
junior ones in the event of a default.
Plantin’s model features multiple 
tranches because it includes several 
classes of potential investors with 
different degrees of sophistication (for 
example, hedge funds, pension funds, 
and individual investors). For Plan-
tin, a sophisticated investor is more 
likely to discover when a given pool of 
assets is worth buying, whereas a less 
sophisticated investor is more likely to 
remain uninformed. Having multiple 
investors that differ in their sophistica-
tion allows for multiple tranches in the 
optimal structure.
Plantin produces useful insights 
by explicitly modeling the sale of ABS 
as an auction. Auctions are the com-
mon sales method when securities are 
privately placed (as opposed to being 
publicly issued).14  The auction may 
be informal, in which case the issuer 
privately consults each potential buyer 
before choosing the best offer. Alter-
natively, if there are many potential 
bidders, a formal auction may be used, 
typically a first-price sealed-bid auc-
tion.15  In either case, economists have 
a well-developed set of insights about 
the forces at play in an auction.16 
In particular, in an auction where 
each bidder has his own information 
about the true value of the items being 
sold, there is the risk that the buyer 
who wins the auction is the one who 
has overpaid. This is known as the 
winner’s curse. This problem should be 
familiar to anyone who has won an 
eBay bidding war, only to later discover 
that the item is available for retail pur-
chase at a lower price. Note that the 
winner’s curse is not the result of bid-
ders’ allowing their emotions to get the 
better of their reason. Rather, it arises 
because bidders are not equally well 
informed about the valuation of the 
object (in this example, the price for 
which it can be bought elsewhere). A 
rational bidder takes this into account 
when bidding. As a result, instead of 
bidding his estimate of the object’s 
value, the bidder will shave down his 
bid to reflect the fact that he is likelier 
to win when he has overestimated the 
value of the object.
In Plantin’s model, the issuer 
would like to maximize participation 
in the auctions for the securities he 
offers. The reason is that the more 
potential bidders there are, the likelier 
it is that some bidder will receive 
information that confirms that these 
assets are indeed of high quality, in 
which case he would be willing to pay 
a high price. In particular, the issuer 
would like to encourage sophisticated 
investors to participate, since they 
are likeliest to receive information 
concerning the asset. On the other 
hand, the more sophisticated investors 
there are, the more severe the winner’s 
curse. The reason is that those inves-
tors who are not informed know they 
will win the auction only if none of the 
other investors learn that the assets are 
of high quality. If many of the other 
investors are sophisticated, the absence 
13 For example, banks are among the most active 
buyers of  higher-rated senior tranches.  The 
reader may find it strange to think of banks as 
unsophisticated, but Jianping Mei and Anthony 
Saunders have demonstrated that — at least in 
the case of real estate loans — banks seem to act   
naively in lending on the basis of past returns 
rather than expected future performance.  Of 
course, degrees of sophistication need not 
explain why banks favor the senior tranches 
— there are regulatory reasons for banks to 
invest in less risky securities.
14 In a private placement, securities are issued 
to “qualified institutional investors” (such as 
insurance companies), rather than to the general 
public, as in a public offering. The advantage 
is that there is much less regulation; the 
disadvantage is that since there is a very limited 
secondary market, the price received is typically 
lower. The “Bowie bonds” discussed earlier were 
privately placed; Prudential Insurance Company 
purchased the entire issue. More generally, 
private placements make up approximately 15 
percent of all nonmortgage ABS issued.
15 In a first-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder 
submits a sealed bid to the seller (a bid that is 
hidden from other bidders). The high bidder 
wins and pays his bid for the good. Generally, 
a sealed-bid format has two distinct parts: a 
bidding period in which participants submit their 
bids, and a resolution phase in which the bids 
are opened and the winner determined. 
16 See, for example, the book by Paul Klemperer 
and the book by Paul Milgrom.22   Q3  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
When a bank securitizes mortgages, investors 
in the mortgage-backed securities are virtually 
guaranteed that they will be paid in full, 
regardless of how the bank itself fares in the 
future. 
of higher bids suggests that the assets 
are indeed of very low quality. Thus, 
the uninformed investors are timid 
in their bidding, which will reduce 
the issuer’s revenue from the auction. 
Thus, designing the structure so as to 
encourage more sophisticated investors 
to participate in the auction creates 
a tradeoff: Sophisticated investors 
— who are likelier to be well-informed 
about the assets — will bid more 
aggressively and so will pay a higher 
price for high-quality assets. But they 
exacerbate the severity of the winner’s 
curse for the uninformed investors and 
make them timid bidders.
Tranching plays a dual role in 
resolving this tradeoff. It draws in so-
phisticated investors by creating an in-
formationally sensitive junior tranche, 
as in Boot and Thakor’s model. Since 
Plantin assumes that sophisticated 
investors must bear a higher cost to 
participate in the auction for any given 
tranche, these investors focus their ef-
forts only on the most junior tranche.17  
By contrast, unsophisticated investors 
participate in the auctions for all of 
the tranches. Since the sophisticated 
investors bid for only the most junior 
tranche, the unsophisticated inves-
tors can bid aggressively for the senior 
tranches without fear of the winner’s 
curse, which increases the issuer’s rev-
enue.18  While these unsophisticated 
investors also bid for the most junior 
tranches, the winner’s curse means 
that they do so very conservatively 
and therefore are less likely to end up 
holding these tranches when the auc-
tion closes. This is consistent with the 
empirical evidence presented earlier: 
junior tranches do indeed seem to be 
held by more sophisticated investors.
REGULATION: ANOTHER 
DRIVER OF SECURITIZATION
Legal factors and government 
regulation are also important drivers of 
securitization. Three main regulatory 
and legal forces encourage securi-
tization and determine some of its 
characteristics. 
Securitization May Reduce 
Bankruptcy Costs. As mentioned 
above, securitization is typically off 
balance sheet in that the underlying 
assets are legally separated from the 
firm so that the firm’s creditors do 
not have any claim on these assets. 
Recall that the Modigliani-Miller 
proposition assumed that bankruptcy 
is costless. In practice, of course, it is 
not. Bankruptcy costs take two forms: 
direct costs, such as lawyers’ fees and 
court costs, and indirect costs, which 
include difficulties in raising funds to 
make profitable investments, ineffi-
cient investments undertaken while in 
bankruptcy, and so on. These indirect 
costs may also affect a firm when it is 
in financial distress, that is, even when 
it is close to bankruptcy. Investors 
(both shareholders and creditors) will, 
of course, ultimately bear these costs 
because the value of their securi-
ties will be impaired in bankruptcy. 
Anticipating these costs, investors 
will be more reluctant to offer funds 
in the first place, which will raise the 
firm’s cost of financing (since they will 
obtain a lower price for any securities 
they offer).
Economists Gary Gorton and 
Nicholas Souleles point out that 
moving assets off balance sheet can 
be helpful because firms can mitigate 
these bankruptcy costs by preclud-
ing creditors’ access to these assets.19  
For example, when a bank securitizes 
mortgages, investors in the mortgage-
backed securities are virtually guar-
anteed that they will be paid in full, 
regardless of how the bank itself fares 
in the future. Consequently, they are 
willing to offer a high price for these 
securities. By contrast, if the bank 
retains the mortgages, investors will 
share in both the cash flows from the 
assets and the costs the issuer incurs 
should it find itself in financial distress. 
As a result, investors offer a relatively 
lower price for these securities. This 
is particularly true for risky, low-rated 
issuers. A classic example is Chrysler: 
It successfully used securitization in a 
period of financial distress (1990-91) 
when it could neither finance car loans 
in the commercial paper market nor 
issue long-term debt.20 
However, not every type of asset 
lends itself to securitization. Econo-
mists Kenneth Ayotte and Stav Gaon 
17 Plantin argues that this is because it is difficult 
for sophisticated investors to find retail clients 
to ultimately hold these securities; for example, 
only wealthy “qualified investors” are permitted 
to invest in hedge funds. 
18 The idea that creating a riskless security can 
encourage participation by uninformed investors 
was first used by Gary Gorton and George 
Pennacchi to explain how insuring bank deposits 
protects uninformed investors and thereby 
makes them willing to fund banks.
19 Bankruptcy costs are also further reduced 
by the credit enhancement that is a feature of 
nearly all securitizations.
20 See the article by Dennis Cantwell.  Business Review  Q3  2005   23 www.philadelphiafed.org
21 Gorton and Souleles suggest that another 
reason firms may not want to securitize all 
assets is that interest payments on off-balance-
sheet debt are not always tax-deductible to 
the issuing firm (although in practice lawyers 
have developed structures that allow the tax 
advantages to flow back to the issuer).
22 In addition to minimum capital requirements, 
bank regulators can also limit regulatory 
arbitrage through the examination process.
show that if the assets are essential for 
the firm’s continuing operations, the 
firm’s losing control over them through 
a securitization may imperil the firm’s 
existence in case of financial distress. 
The reason is that the holders of the 
securitized assets have little interest 
in the firm’s continued survival and 
may not be willing to compromise to 
help the firm avoid liquidation. Ayotte 
and Gaon offer the example of the 
bankrupt steel firm LTV, which made 
this argument as part of an attempt 
to regain control of inventory it had 
securitized.21 
Securitization Can Lower 
Banks’ Regulatory Capital Require-
ments. Some economists have argued 
that bank capital requirements are im-
portant drivers of securitization. This 
is also known as regulatory arbitrage be-
cause securitization might allow banks 
to shift assets to lower their minimum 
regulatory capital requirements. In 
particular, to the extent that minimum 
capital requirements do not assign 
to each asset the capital that would 
be held by an unregulated financial 
intermediary, it might be profitable for 
banks to sell off low-risk loans (such as 
mortgages) and retain high-risk assets. 
Note that for this to be an effective 
“arbitrage,” the loan’s buyer must have 
a lower capital requirement for holding 
that loan than the selling bank (for 
example, an unregulated hedge fund). 
As long as this is true, it is cheaper for 
the buyer to hold the loan on its books 
than for the bank, and both can profit 
from its sale.22 23 In rough terms, the capital requirement means 
that for each dollar lent, the bank must secure at 
least 8 cents of funding in the form of retained 
earnings, stock, or long-term subordinated debt 
(i.e., debt that is junior to deposits).
24 The data on small-business loans are 
from the paper by Sumit Agarwal, Souphala 
Chomsisengphet, and Chunlin Liu.
25 Because the small-business loan repays 100-
1.5 percent = 98.5 percent of the time. As a 
result, even if this loan returns nothing when it 
defaults, its expected return is at least 0.985 × 
7.4 percent = 7.29 percent. 
Consider the following example. 
A bank can make one of two $100,000 
loans, both of which require 8 cents 
of capital per dollar lent.23  One loan 
is an adjustable-rate mortgage with an 
80 percent loan-to-value ratio. In 2000 
the interest rate on such a mortgage 
averaged 7 percent, and the default 
rate was approximately 0.5 percent. 
The other loan is a small-business 
line of credit, with an interest rate of 
7.4 percent and a default rate of 1.5 
percent.24  Notice that the expected 
return on the mortgage can never be 
higher than 7 percent. By contrast, the 
small-business loan has an expected 
return that is at least 7.29 percent.25  
Given the regulatory capital require-
ments, the bank may prefer to hold 
the risky small-business loan and 
sell the safe mortgage. The reason is 
that under current minimum capital 
requirements, both loans require the 
bank to hold $8,000 of capital, but the 
high-risk small-business loan has an 
expected return that is nearly 30 basis 
points higher. 
The evidence as to whether 
regulatory arbitrage is an empirically 
significant driver of securitization 
is mixed. On the one hand, Brent 
Ambrose, Michael LaCour-Little, and 
Anthony Sanders do find evidence 
consistent with regulatory arbitrage 
in the mortgage market. By contrast, 
however, Bernadette Minton, Anthony 
Sanders, and Philip Strahan provide 
empirical evidence that casts doubt on 
the importance of regulatory arbitrage 
and instead supports the hypothesis 
that securitization is motivated by a 
desire to reduce bankruptcy costs. In 
particular, they find that unregulated 
issuers (which are not subject to capital 
requirements) seem to be more active 
securitizers than banks. Moreover, it is 
the riskier firms (for which bankruptcy 
is obviously more of a concern) that 
use securitization the most.
Pension Fund Regulations 
Can Explain Credit Enhancement 
and Tranching. Finally, regulations 
governing pension funds are also 
important for securitization. The 
most prominent of these regulations 
are found in the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA). 
ERISA regulations govern pension 
funds’ investment portfolios. Among 
these regulations are those that restrict 
funds’ holdings of low-rated or very 
junior asset-backed securities in certain 
circumstances. This clearly encourages 
the use of credit enhancement in ABS 
structures and, in particular, the cre-
ation of high-rated senior tranches.26  
In light of the regulations’ obvious 
importance, it is somewhat surprising 
that economists have yet to examine 




One important question we have 
not yet discussed is the social implica-
tions of securitization. That is, does 
it provide a net benefit to society or 
perhaps simply lead to a transfer of 
wealth from one party to another?  
Said differently, many of the models 
26 Many institutional investors also have self-
imposed restrictions on the credit quality of 
their portfolio.24   Q3  2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
we have discussed involve the issuer’s 
structuring the securitization so as 
to maximize his revenues. But is the 
issuer’s gain merely the investor’s loss?
Securitization Can Be Socially 
Beneficial. Recall that bankruptcy 
costs seem to be an important driver of 
securitization (explaining its off-bal-
ance-sheet feature as well as the credit 
enhancement). This ability to mitigate 
bankruptcy costs is certainly likely to 
be beneficial; we have already seen, 
for example, that securitization helped 
Chrysler Corporation continue operat-
ing during a time of financial distress. 
In many of the other models we 
examined, securitization is also implic-
itly beneficial, since it is structured so 
as to reduce information asymmetries. 
That is, investors may be willing to 
pay more for certain tranches either 
because they are more confident that 
the securities they are buying are of 
high quality or because the structure 
makes it more profitable for them to 
become informed about the assets. 
In either case, this lowers the cost of 
financing for the firm and could allow 
it to fund profitable projects that might 
otherwise be infeasible. This is good 
for society; everyone can be made 
better off if profitable projects are not 
forgone.
Securitization May Sometimes 
Be Harmful. Having said this, how-
ever, securitization could potentially 
have social costs for several reasons. 
To the extent that securitization 
permits firms to circumvent bank-
ruptcy law or to circumvent banks’ 
minimum capital requirements, it 
is unlikely to be socially optimal. In 
addition, the recent example of Enron 
has shown that securitization can 
sometimes be used to facilitate fraud. 
By moving assets and liabilities off 
its balance sheet, Enron was able to 
muddy investors’ picture of the firm. 
Enron also implicitly guaranteed some 
of the assets it securitized, so that they 
were not truly off balance sheet. As 
a result, the firm was actually much 
riskier than it appeared.
Finally, in some of our models, 
securities were structured so as to 
maximize the investors’ incentives 
to become informed. While this may 
sometimes facilitate the funding of 
projects that otherwise would not be 
financed, it provides no net social 
benefit if the project would have 
been financed without securitization. 
Moreover, by driving potential buyers 
to spend money on acquiring infor-
mation, the issuer would actually be 
encouraging unnecessary investment 
in information production.27  To put it 
another way, society as a whole would 
be better off if the assets were simply 
sold without being subdivided into 
tranches, and as a result, investors did 
not need to invest the resources neces-
sary to purchase these junior tranches.
 
CONCLUSION
Securitization is a large and 
growing area of corporate finance. Its 
key features are that it is typically off 
balance sheet, combines many small 
assets into a pool, and often divides 
this pool of cash flows into tranches. 
According to some theories, 
off-balance-sheet financing and, to a 
limited extent, tranching are responses 
to government regulations. Bankruptcy 
costs also help explain why securitiza-
tion is conducted off balance sheet and 
also why it commonly features credit 
enhancement. 
Another set of explanations we 
have explored is based on the exis-
tence of differences in information 
about the underlying assets — either 
between issuers and potential inves-
tors or between different classes of 
investors. These theories show that 
securities may be designed to alleviate 
these differences in information, so 
that outside investors are comfortable 
purchasing them, and they may also 
be designed to encourage investors 
to become better informed about the 
underlying assets. This is manifested in 
the pooling of assets and the subse-
quent division of these cash flows into 
tranches.28  
While there is a well-developed 
body of theoretical work that explores 
the determinants and structure of
securitization, the empirical sig-
nificance of these models, and in 
particular the impact of government 
regulation and bankruptcy law on 
securitization, remains a ripe area for 
future research.
28  Information asymmetries and regulations are 
not the only explanations for why new securi-
ties are introduced.  There is an interesting 
literature in which securities are designed to fill 
unmet needs for risk-sharing, that is, to complete 
markets.  For example, a futures contract allows 
farmers to lock in a price for wheat so that they 
are not exposed to the risk that prices will col-
lapse. For a model in which completing markets 
drives financial innovation, see Franklin Allen 
and Douglas Gale.
According to some theories, off-balance-sheet 
ﬁnancing and, to a limited extent, tranching are 
responses to government regulations.
B R
27 This is similar to the argument often made 
against advertising.  Business Review  Q3  2005   25 www.philadelphiafed.org
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